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"CONTROL

OF INFERIOR BY SUPERIOR
TIONS BY PROPER WRITS."

JURISDIC-

GEORGE R. HUNT'

In discussing this question it seems unnecessary to make
any comment upon appeals, writs of error, writs of certiorari,
or writs of false judgment, by means of which the judgments of
inferior courts are affirmed, modified, reversed, and frequently
annulled, as these writs are regulated entirely by statute both
as to the mode of taking appeals and as to the case in which
and the circumstances under which litigants can avail themselves of the remedy.
The writ of injunction has a purely personal effect, is directed to parties to litigation, actual or threatened, and has been
well described as "a judicial process operating in personam."
Under writs of habeas corpus want of jurisdiction and excess of jurisdiction are legitimate and necessary subjects of inquiry, and by the issuance of this writ superior courts frequently review the decisions of inferior courts, and annul judgments rendered, thereby controlling inferior courts.
The two writs of most interest to the profession are the
writs of prohibition and mandamus, though the Court of Appeals by section 110 of the Constitution is not limited to these
two writs by name in issuing such writs under its original jurisdiction, "as may be necessary to give it general control of inferior jurisdictions."
The first clause of section 110 of the present Constitution
of Kentucky provides that:
"The Court of Appeals shall have appellate jurisdiction only, which
shall be co-extensive with the State, under such restrictions and regulations not repugnant to this Constitution, as may from time to time
be prescribed by law."

This clause is practically the same in substance as the provisions relating to the jurisdictions of the Court of Appeals,
which are found in the Constitutions of 1792, 1799 and 1850.
Editor's Note.-This paper was read by Mr. Hunt before the Kentucky State Bar Association in 1916. No attempt has been'made to
collect or comment upon the decisions rendered by the Court of Ap-beals of Kentucky since 1916.
*Attorney at law, LeXington, Ky.
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Under this provision the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in
Morgan v. The, Register, Hardin's Rep., page 619, decided
1808; Daniel v. The County of Warren, 1st Bib. 496, decided
1809; Arnold, &c. v. Shields, &c., 5th Dana 18, decided in 1837,
and Sasseen v. Hammond, 18 Ben Monroe, 672, decided in 1857;
held that it could not issue a writ of mandamus, as the writ of
mandamus involved original instead of appellate jurisdiction,
and that it could not issue a writ of prohibition for the purpose of interfering with the action of a circuit court, unless it
had appellate jurisdiction and revisory power by appeal over
the controversy:
In the case of Hindman v. Toney, 97 Ky. 413, the Court of
Appeals in explaining the provisions of the Constitutions of
1792, 1799 and 1850, and in commenting upon its previous decisions rendered prior to 1891, made this statement:
"It was held prior to the adoption of the present Constitution that
there could be a proceeding in this court for prohibition only in a case
in which in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction it had the power of
controlling the inferior court by a direct revision of its judicial acts.
And it was further held that a writ of prohibition is not an appropriate
proceeding in a court of merely appellate jurisdiction, inasmuch as
the revisory power of such a court can afford adequate relief without
a resort to a proceeding of that character."

In the present Constitution, adopted in 1891, a new clause
has been added, which was not in our previous Constitutions,
which is as follows:
"Said court (referring to the Court of Appeals) shall have power
to 'ssue such writs as may be necessary to give it general control of
inferior jurisdictions."

Under this clause of the Constitution, the Court of Appeals
has full power to issue writs in all cases where it is necessary to
give it general control of inferior jurisdictions. Such writs are
issued in pursuance of and under an original jurisdiction and
not an appellate jurisdiction. The writs of prohibition and
mandamus are frequently referred to as counterparts of each
other, the one being negative in its character, the other affirmative. Each of these writs was a common law writ, and
each was early recognized in this State as an existing legal
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remedy by which courts of inferior jurisdiction could be controlled under proper limitations by courts of superior jurisdiction.
"The writ of prohibition is that process by which a superior court
prevents an inferior court or tribunal from usurping or exercising a
jurisdiction with which it has not been vested by law,"

as defined by one of the text writers.
Chief Justice Robertson in the case of
Shield, says that:

Arnold, &c.

v.

"According to the common law superior courts are entitled to a
general supervision over all subordinate courts for the purpose of keeping them in their prescribed sphere and of preventing usurpation, and
therefore, in England the King's Bench and the Common Pleas have
a general, and the chancellor a qualified authority to restrain by prohibition all other courts inferior to them from exercising any arrogated
jurisdiction."

While the power of the Court of Appeals prior to the adoption of the present Constitution was limited to a control of
inferior courts by the writ of prohibition, to matters and controversies over which it could exercise a revisory power under
its appellate jurisdiction, there has never been any question
in this State about the right of circuit courts to issue such writs
for the purpose of controlling jurisdictions inferior to it. This
right existed in the circuit courts under the common law and independently of any statute, but under the first Civil Code prepared by M. C. Johnson, James Harlan, and J. W. Stevenson,
finally completed and adopted in 1854, the right of a circuit
court to issue writs of prohibition was provided for by statute.
Section 528 of the Code of 1854 is the same as section 479 of the
present Civil Code, which is as follows:
"The writ of prohibition is an order of the circuit court to an inferior court of limited jurisdiction prohibiting it from proceeding in
a matter out of its jurisdiction."

The principles of law which regulate the -issuing of writs
of prohibition in the circuit court and in the Court of Appeals
are the same. Circuit courts in issuing such writs, therefore,
follow the decisions of the highest appellafe courts, and when
the grounds for issuing such writs are finally stated they will be
found equally applicable to the issuing of such writs both in
the circuit court and in the Court of Appeals.
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In the cases of Montgomery v. Viers, Judge, 130 Ky. 694;
Commonwealth v. Peter, Judge, 136 Ky. 689, and Megee v.
Weisenger, 147 Ky. 371, the Court of Appeals held that, although
section 110 of the Constitution may confer ample authority upon
this court to issue a writ (referring in the cases both to the writ
of mandamus and writ of prohibition), in such a case the rule
here is that, if the applicant has an adequate remedy elsewhere,
we refrain from acting under our original jurisdiction. The
Court of Appeals, however, in these cases recognized the existence of its original jurisdiction to control courts inferior
to the circuit court under section 110 of the Constitution, but
refused to interfere on the ground that the petitioners had an
adequate remedy in that an application could have been made
to the circuit court for the issuance of the writs restraining a
court inferior to it from acting in excess of its jurisdiction.
In the case of Rush v. Denhart, Judge, 138 Ky. 238, the
Court of Appeals, however, granted a writ of prohibition restraining the county judge of Warren County from hearing an
application to revoke a license after the county judge had refused to vacate the bench, upon the filing of affidavits showing
bias, on the ground that the petitioner had no adequate remedy,
but in this case an application had previously been made to the
circuit court for a writ of prohibition, which was refused by the
circuit court.
In the case of Rush v. Denhart, no appeal was taken from
the judgment of the circuit court to the Court of Appeals from
the judgment refusing the writ of prohibition, so that this case
seems to be in conflict with the cases of Montgomery v. Viers,
Megee v. Weisenger, and Commonwealt& v. Peter, above re-ferred to. As these last cases, however, have been frequently
cited by the Court of Appeals, it seems to be the settled doctrine of the Court of Appeals that a writ of prohibition will not
be issued upon original application to it to restrain courts inferior to the circuit court under its original jurisdiction, but that
it is the safer and better practice to apply to the circuit court for
such a writ for the purpose of controlling jurisdictions inferior
to the circuit court.
Writs of prohibition can be issued to restrain judicial tribunals, and cannot be issued to restrain ministerial officers or,
private individuals.
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In the case of Campbellsville Telephone Company v. Patteson, Judge, 69 S. W. 1070.114 Ky. 52, the court declined to issue a writ of prohibition restraining the Campbellsville Telephone Company from installing its plant under what was alleged to be a void ordinance, on the ground that such writs were
issued to restrain judicial tribunals from unauthorized judicial
acts and could not be issued against individuals.
In the recent case of Equitable Life Assurance Society v.
Hardin, 166 Ky. 51, the court declined to issue a writ of prohibition against the master commissioner, restraining him from
proceeding with a hearing under an order of reference, and
stated the conclusion reached, as follows:
"No writ of prohibition will be issued against ministerial officers,
such as commissioners of courts, because section 110 of the Constitution confines the powers of this court to issuing writs of prohibition against judicial tribunals."

In the case of Morgan v. Clements, Circuit Court Commissioner, 153 Ky. 33, an attempt was made by a writ of prohibition to restrain the master commissioner from collecting a sale
bond, executed in an action, pending in the circuit court. The
court declined to issue the writ on two grounds: first, because
the writ could only be issued to control judicial tribunals, and
second, because there was an adequate remedy in that application could be made for relief in the circuit court.
In the case of Superintendent of Common Schools of
Daviess County v. Taylor, 105 Ky. 387, a teacher sought to restrain the superintendent of common schools from trying her
or removing her for cause. The petitioner sought a writ of
prohibition, if the superintendent was a judicial officer or an
injunction if he was not a .judicial officer. The restraining order
was granted by the lower court and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. While there is no indication in the opinion s to
which writ was -given, it is clear under the other decisions of the
Court of Appeals, that the issuance of a writ of prohibition
would have been unauthorized, as the superintendent of common schools is not a judicial officer or tribunal under the Constitution. It seems to be settled, therefore, that writs of prohibition can be issued only to restrain judicial officers or tribunals.
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AN

ADEQUATE REMEDY A BARn TO THE WRIT

In the recent case of Ohio River' Contract Co. v. Gordon,
170 Ky. 418, the court announced this doctrine as follows:
"Only in exceptional cases or where an unusual state of facts is
presented, which makes it apparent, that injurious consequences will
result, against which there is no other adequate remedy, will the writ
of prohibition be used, and then for the purpose most often of restoring the administration of justice to its accustomed channel, that
its ordinary course may be insured:'

In the case of Jenkins v. Berry, 83 S. W. 594, 119 Ky. 350,
the court used this language:
'"Under the power granted by section 110 of the Constitution, the
court has repeatedly exercised the power thus conferred, not only to
prevent courts of inferior jurisdiction from acting in matters out of
their jurisdiction, but also in cases where the right of appeal did not
afford a plain, speedy and adequate remedy."

To the same effect are White v. Kirby, 147 Ky. 496; Weaver
v. Toney, 107 Ky. 426; Morgan v. Clements, 153 Ky. 33; Fish. v.
Benton, 138 Ky. 644, and numerous other cases, which might be
cited.
The remedy must be "plain, speedy and adequate." If the
petitioner has such remedy by appeal, or by other writ, motion
or proceeding, the writ will usually be refused.
In 32 Cyc., p. 617, the doctrine is thus stated:
"But the concurrent remedy is not regarded as adequate, so as
to prevent the issuance of the writ, if it does not afford the particular
right to the party aggrieved, or if its slowness is likely to produce
immediate. injury or inischief."

There is no better illustration of the doctrine stated in Cyc.
than the decision of the Court of Appeals in the recent case of
Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Hardin, 166 Ky. 51. In
that case an order was entered, requiring the company to produce before the commissioner all of the books and papers, which
were in New York, or copies of same, which were pertinent to
the case. The court held that the remedy by appeal was wholly
inadequate, and it might have been added that the remedy by
appeal on account of "its slowness would have caused imme'
diate injury and mischief, if resorted to." This case will be more
fully discussed later on.
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In the case of Rush v. Denhart, 138 Ky. 245, the court said:
"If we should once lay down the rule that application by original proceeding might be made to us to stay the hand of the inferior
jurisdiction whenever in the opinion of counsel, the ruling was prejudicial, although it might not leave a plaintiff without adequate
remedy, we would have much of 'our time occupied in the settlement
of questions that could be brought before us in the regular way by
appeal. Inferior courts would be obstructed in the hearing and disposal of cases, and much confusion and uncertainty would follow."
The right of appeal is not necessary to give an adequate
remedy.
The right of appeal is regulated entirely by statute both as
to time, manner and circumstances, under which it may be exercised, and is a matter of legislative discretion.
In the case of Standard Oil Co. v. iann, 17 R. 832, a motion
for a writ of prohibition to restrain the judge of the circuit
court from trying sixty-five separate indictments returned against
the company, which was based on the sole ground that there
might be an adverse decision, which which there would be no appeal, was refused by the court. The court said:
"The fact that no appeal is given cannot affect the question, because the legislative department of the State has the power of limiting the jur'isdiction of this court as to appeals."
In the case of Bank Lick Turnpike Company v. Phelps, 81
Ky. 613, the court expressed the same doctrune as follows:
"That no provision has been made for an appeal from erroneous
orders of the court in this case, does not authorize a perversion of the
purpose for which by law a writ of prohibition may be granted, or its
extension to cases in which it does not lie."
To the same effect is the case of Carey v. Sampson, 150 Ky
460. It does not follow, however, that the writ cannot be issued,
when there is no right of appeal. The last clause of section 110
unquestionably gives to the Court of Appeals original jurisdiction to control inferior courts even when it has no appellate jurisdiction. The clause in question was added for that purpose.
The right to restrain the inferior court from acting does not
exist, merely because the judgment of the lower court is or may
be erroneous.
In the case of Rush v. Denhardt,138 Ky. 238, the court upon
original application, and not by way of appeal from the circuit
court, which had refused the writ, granted a writ of prohibition,
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restraining the county judge from proceeding with a trial, after
he had refused to vacate the bench upon the filing of affidavits
showing bias. The court in this case, said:
"But we have the power, whenever justice and the right of the
matter seem to demand it, to interfere in behalf of a petitioner, who
has no adequate remedy or means of obtaining relief except to invoke the extraordinary power conferred on this court by the Constitution. And a case might present itself in which the ends of
justice would require us to issue the writ to restrain an inferior jurisdiction from doing an act or rendering a judgment, that the complaining party in the ordinary course of judicial procedure would have
no relief against."

In the case of Board of PrisonCommissioners v. Crumbaugh,

Police Judge, 161 Ky. 540, the court granted a writ of prohibition upon original application, though no application was made
to the circuit court, restraining the police judge of Eddyville
from hearing a writ of habeas corpus, and from which no appeal
could have been taken from the order made, and in rendering its
opinion, said:
"Under section
issue such writs as
ferior jurisdictions,
issue in a case like

110 of the Constitution this court has power to
may be necessary to give it general control of inand it is well settled that a writ of prohibition may
this, whenever the inferior court is proceeding out

of its jurisdiction, but an appeal will not furnish an adequate remedy,
or there Is no remedy."

The mere fact that the petitioner has no appeal from an
adverse decision, which he regards as erroneous, does not give
him the right to a writ of prohibition; but the issuing of the
writ in such case is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of
the superior court, and if the judge of the lower court is biased,
or refuses to vacate the bench upon the filing of an affidavit in
proper form, or if for any other reason the superior court is
convinced, even though the lower court has jurisdiction to act,
that its powers are being abused, the decisions of the Court of
Appeals seem to indicate, that the writ will be issued, or its issuance by a lower court approved.
OBJECTON MUST FIRST BE MIADE IN LowER COURT
Ordinarily application must first be made to the lower court
to pass upon the questibn of jurisdiction, or usurpation of its
powers, before such court can be restrained by the writ of prohibition issued by a superior court. This was the proceeding
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adopted in the courts under the common law, and has been almost
universally followed in the cases reported in Kentucky. Exceptional cases may arise, where such procedure is not feasible or
possible.
In the case of Hargis v. Parker,85 S. W., p. 706, the court
in discussing this question, said:
"Ordinarily, this court mnight well refuse to issue the writ before the question of jurisdiction had been made in the lower court, for
it might be presumed that until that court had proceeded out of its
jurisdiction, or had evinced by an order of court that it proposed doing
so, it would not, or, at any rate, that the complainant was not injured,
nor threatened with injury till then. But this is not necessarily so in
all cases. If the situation disclosed be such as that to take the ordinary course would be of itself to subject the complainant to irreparable loss, the writ should Issue without the objections having been
made below. The matter of judicial courtesy should yield to substantial -personal rights of litigants, such as a sacrifice of their liberty.
If it be true that the Fayette court is proceeding without jurisdiction,
it is not substantial justice that it should be allowed to take the bodies
of the complainants, confine them in jail without bail, as it might do
at its discretion, subject the parties to enormous expense in defending the case, even if it went no further than a trial of the question of
jurisdiction, and say to them, 'Your remedy is solely by appeal if you
have been wronged.' We think the section of the Constitution, though
it be deemed only declaratory of the common law on the subject, confers the power and jurisdiction on-this court to intervene by the writ
of prohibition to stay the inferior courts of the State from proceeding
out of their jurisdiction. It may issue whether or not there is an appeal. Whether it ought to issue in advance of the decision of the lower
court, or whether the party will be left to his remedy by appeal, will
depend on whether that' remedy is given and whether it Is adequate
or not. This court will be slow to use the writ where there is an appeal, but its valuable office to the citizen who is being oppressed by unlawful assumption of judicial authority will not be limited by set
rules."
DEFECT OR ExCESS OF JURISDICTION

The Court of Appeals under section 110 of the Constitution
has the power ito issue such writs as may be necessary to give it
general control over inferior jurisdictions.
Section 949, Kentucky Statutes, contains a similar provision, putting the Constitution into effect, if legislation was necessary for that purpose.
Section 479 of the Civil Code defines a writ of prohibition,
as an order "prohibiting it (an inferior court) from proceeding
in a matter out of its jurisdiction."
Section 25 of the Criminal Code, provides that:
"The circuit court of any county may by writ of prohibition, restrain all other-courts of inferior jurisdiction of the county from exceeding their criminal jurisdiction."
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If the inferior tribunal has no jurisdiction of the subject
matter, there is a defect of jurisdiction, and it can be restrained
in the proper tribunal from usurpation of judicial authority by
a writ of prohibition. It is frequently said, "that the issuing
of such a writ is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion," but the courts of superior jurisdiction uniformly grant
the writ, where there is no jurisdiction of the subject matter in
the lower court. Where the court has jurisdiction of the subject matter, and the question of the jurisdiction of the person
turns upon some fact to be determined by the court, on account
of invalidity of service or improper service or misjoinder of
parties, our Court of Appeals has held, that the lower court has
jurisdiction, and that it will not interfere by -writ of prohibition,
even though the lower court is wrong, but that the remedy is by
appeal. This question would be an exceedingly interesting one,
to discuss in this connection, if time prmitted. The remedy by
appeal is wholly inadequate in such case, because while the court
will correct the error by reversal of the judgment of the lower
court, the penalty is the waiver of a right, given by the law, as
a condition of the reversal. If a legal right must be waived without fault on the part of a litigant as a condition precedent to the
right of appeal, then either by judicial construction or by legislation the right of the litigant ought to be preserved.
The question of excess of jurisdiction, or abuse of judicial
power given is much more difficult. Every departure from
judicial power cannot be corrected by writ of prohibition, because every error made by a lower court, whether it be declaring an invalid law valid, or giving a jury an erroneous instruction as a basis of determining the rights of parties, or incorrectly
determining any question of law, is illegal. In cases of usurpation of judicial power or the abuse of judicial functions, or the
failure of lower courts to keep within their prescribed sphere,
the issuance of a writ of prohibition does not go as a matter of
right, but is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of ihe
superior court. The issuance of the writ depends upon the
method of procedure in the lower'court, the right of appeal: the
existence of an adequate remedy, which is plain and speedy, the
wrongs to be corrected and the real justice of the situation.
Some of the cases will be referred to in which the writ has
been issued by the Court of Appeals, which will show the general trend of judicial decisions in this State.
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In the recent case of Ohio River Contract Co. v. Gordn, 170
Ky. 418, the court used certain expressions, which indicate under
what circumstances the writ will be issued.
". . it is manifest that it was not intended by the lawmakers
as a general principle, that this court, by the use of any extraordinary writs or processes, should interfere with the jurisdiction of the
inferior courts, or with their discretion in the hearing or decision of
questions of either law or fact, of which they have original jurisdiction or with the course of justice in the inferior courts when it is proceeding in the ordinary and usual way. Only in exceptional cases or
when an unusual state of facts is presented, which makes it apparent
that injurious consequences will result, against which there is no
other adequate remedy, will the writ of prohibition be used, and then
for the purpose most often of restoring the administration of justice
to its accustomed channel, that its ordinary course may be insured.
The writ of prohibition is not a writ which can be demanded as a
matter of right and of course, but its granting or refusal is a matter
which lies within the discretion of this court. For the reasons above
stated, it has exercised its discretion to grant such a writ very sparingly, and then 'only as a matter of necessity to shield from injustice,
against which there vas no other adequate remedy and to preserve
the orderly administration of "the laws."
"A review of all the cases decided by this court upon application
for writ of prohibition under section 110, supra, sustains the view, that
the writ is granted as a matter of sound discretion, determined upon
the facts of the particular case, which make it apparent, that an injury or violation of one's rights is threatened, and against the results
of which he has no adequate remedy, other than the writ of prohibition."

The case of Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Hardin,156
Ky. 51, above referred to presents a very interesting case of the
exercise of a jurisdiction by the lower court in excess of its
powers, for which a remddy by appeal would have been wholly
inadequate. The principal facts have already been stated. The
court granted the writ directing the judge of the Lincoln Circuit
Court to set aside the order requiring the company to produce
all of its books, records, papers, and documents at Standford,
Kentucky. The court refers to numerous decisions rendered and
uses this language:
-"Under section 110 of the Constitution, which provides that this
'court shall have power to issue such writs as may be necessary to give
it a general control of inferior jurisdictions' it has been frequently determined what power this court has in regard to the issual of a writ
of prohibition and when it will interfere with inferior jurisdictions by
the issual of such a writ. The well established doctrine is that this
court has the power to issue such a writ when the inferior court is
proceeding out of its jurisdiction or is proceeding erroneously within
its jurisdiction and the remedy for the error by appeal is not adequate."
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In the case of Bank: Lick Turnpike Co. v. Phelps, County
Judge, 81 Ky. 613, the petitioner sought by writ of prohibition
filed in the circuit court to restrain the county judge of Kenton
County from reducing tolls on roads, under an act, which authorized such action, whenever a road paid more than ten per
centum on its capital stock. The court held, that the county
court had jurisdiction, and that a writ of prohibition could not
be granted to prevent an inferior tribunal from deciding
erroneously, or from enforcing an erroneous judgment, the
remedy being by appeal.
In Weaver v. Toney, 107 Ky. 419, the lower court issued a
mandatory injunction without notice about noon on election
day, commanding the admission of inspectors of a branch of
the Democratic party into the voting booths at the close of the
polls. Certain election officers, who failed to obey the order,
were cited for contempt, and filed in the Court of Appeals an
action for a writ of prohibition to restrain the lower court from
proceeding with the trials. The appellate court held, that the
relief granted by the temporary injunction was final in its
character, conclusive of the rights of the parties without notice
or opportunity to be heard, and in effect void. The court granted
the writ, and in the course of its opinion, stated:
"

..it must be regarded as settled law that in praper cases,

when the inferior tribunal is proceeding out of its jurisdiction, the

power of this court may be invoked to stay the exercise of such jurisdiction; and it would also seem in certain cases, that even where the
inferior tribunal has jurisdiction this court may likewise interfere, If
the remedy by appeal is not entirely adequate, or if the court, in the
exercise of its discretionary powers, shall deem it necessary to so interfere."

In the case of Scott v. Tully, 106 Ky. 69, and the case of
Arnold v. Sheilds, 5 Dana 18, a writ of prohibition was sought
to restrain a lower court from proceeding under an unconstitutional act. The court in each case held, that, if the jurisdiction of the lower court depended exclusively upon the unconstitutional statute, such statute could not confer jurisdiction,
but if the court, independently of the statute, the constitutionality of which was in question, had jurisdiction, then the writ
could not be issued, because an erroneous judgment might be
rendered. As stated, the writ
"Can be sustained only for preventing usurpation of judicial power
by a court, which has no authority to decide the case in which it assumes the right to act judicially."
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In the case of Penningion v. Woolfolk, 79 Ky. 13, the writ
was granted, restraining the lower court from proceeding under
an unconstitutional act, but the lower court did not have jurisdiction independent of the act.
In L. & N. R. Co. v. Miller, 112 Ky. 464, the court held that
it had the right to issue the writ to restrain the lower court
from punishing a party for contempt, when the act complained
of was not fairly within the order of injunction issued, when
fairly construed.
In the case of Hindman v. Toney, 97 Ky. 413, the writ was
issued to restrain the lower court from proceeding to prevent
a conflict between concurrent jurisdictions, in order that the
course of justice might proceed in an orderly manner in the
accustomed channels.
To the same effect is the case of Clark County Court v.
Warner, 76 S. W. 828, in which a controversy arose over the
jurisdiction of the courts of Clark and Madison County on
application for a ferry privilege.
In McCann v. City of Louisville, 63 S. W. 446, a similar
.question arose, and the lower court was restrained from proceeding in matters within its jurisdiction, on the ground that
the circuit court had assumed jurisdiction of the entire controversy, and the conflict would be unseemly.
In the case of Commonwealtli v. Jones, 118 Ky. 889, when
a controversy arose over the proper venue of the crime of
murder, the court held that when the jurisdiction was concurrent, the jurisdiction of the court, first assuming jurisdiction,
was exclusive.
In the case of Morris v. Randall, 129 Ky. 720, the court
granted a writ of prohibition, restraining Morris, who claimed
to be police judge, from proceeding to enforce a judgment
rendered on the ground, that the office and court had no legal
.existence. The court said:
"We are clearly of -opinion, that a writ of prohibition was the

-proper remedy in this case. It is preventive, rather tfian a corrective

remedy, its office being to prevent the usurpation or excess of jurisdiction by judicial tribunals, and to keep the courts within the limits
to which the law confines them; and we do not doubt that, in the
-absence of any other adequate remedy, it lies to prevent unauthorized
individuals from usurping judicial power."

In the case of White v. Kirby, 147 Ky. 496, the court refused a writ of prohibition, by which it was sought to restrain
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the lower court from proceeding on the ground, that it had no
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner, and that his
remedy by appeal was inadequate, in that by exercising his
right of appeal, he would waive the question of jurisdiction of
his person.
In the case of Cullins v. Williams, 156 Ky. 57, involving
proceedings under the juvenile court law, and from the judgment rendered, there was no remedy by appeal, the circuit
court granted a writ of prohibition, restraining the judge of
the county court from proceeding with the trial, and the case
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. A part of the opinion
is as follows:
"For a greater reason should the writ be granted by the circuit
court where, as in the case at bar, it is made to appear that the judge
of the county court will not grant the party applying for the writ a
fair hearing, and that he has, in fact, in advance of said hearing, declared his intention to decide the case against her."

The case of Rush v. Denhardt, 138 Ky. 23S, above referred
to, was cited with approval.
In the case of Fitzpatrick v. Young, 160 Ky. 5, the court
said:
"And this court, in pursuing the authority granted to it by section 110 of the Constitution 'to issue such writ.as may be necessary
to give it general control of inferior jurisdictions,' has, with few exceptions, been controlled in the issual of the writ by the Code provision limiting it to cases in which the court against which the writ
was sought was proceeding out of its jurisdiction. Save in a few exceptional cases when the lower court had jurisdiction of the subject
matter and the parties and there was an adequate remedy by appeal,
this court has refused to issue a writ. But we know of no instance in
which the writ has been denied, when it appeared that the circuit
court was proceeding without authority, and the parties had not
waived their right to raise the question."

In the case of Commonwealth v. Davis, 184 S. W. 1122, an
attempt was made to control the action of the circuit, judge
upon a motion to dismiss an indictment, and the writ was denied. The court said:
"A writ of prohibition may be granted by this court only to prevent an inferior court from exceeding its jurisdiction, but not for the
purpose of controlling a discretion vested in the court."

It is clear, therefore, that an inferior court can be prevented from acting out of or in excess of its jurisdiction by
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writ of prohibition; that whenever a court is acting in excess
of its jurisdiction the issuing of the writ is addressed to the
sound discretion of the court, and depends largely upon the
question of adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise and the
serious consequences, that might be caused in the orderly administration of justice by the failure of the superior court to
interfere.
In practically all of the charters of cities and towns in
this State, there is a provision for testing the validity of ordinances by writs of prohibition, but the remedy as applied to
ordinances is purely statutory and no discussion of the opinions in such cases is deemed essential in this connection.
Article III, section 2 of the Constitution of the United
States provides as follows:
"In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party, the Supreme Court
shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as
to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as
the Congress shall make."

Under the Judicial Code, section 234, section 1211 U. S.
Statutes of 1913, passed by the Congress pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution the power of the Supreme Court to
issue writs of prohibition and mandamus is limited.
The section referred to is as follows:
"The Supreme Court shall have power to issue writs of prohibi-

tion to the district courts, when proceeding as Courts of Admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction; and writs of mandamus, in cases warranted
by the principles and usages of law, or to persons holding office under
the authority of the United States, when a state, or an ambassador, or
other public minister, or a consul, or vice consul is a party."
WRIT OF MANDAMUS

"The modern writ of mandamus," as defined in High's
Extraordinary Legal Remedies, "is a command issuing from
a common law court of competent jurisdiction, in the name of
the state or sovereign, directed to some corporation, officer, or
inferior court, requiring the performance of a particular duty
therein specified, which duty results from the official station
of the party to whom the writ is directed, or from operation of
law."
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The writ is administered upon more clearly defined principles, than ihe writ of prohibition, yet much that has been said
in regard to the writ of prohibition applies with equal force to
the writ of mandamus.
The granting of the writ is the exercise of an original jurisdiction, and not of an appellate jurisdiction as held in the
case of Morgan v. The Register, Hardin 618, and in the ease of
Daniel v. County Court of Warren, 1 Bibb 496, so that prior
to the adoption of the Constitution of 1891, the Court of Appeals had no right to grant the writ upon original application.
Section 110 of the present Constitution gives to the Court of
Appeals original jurisdiction to grant the writ when necessary
to control inferior jurisdictions. The circuit courts had such
power under the common law prior to the adoption of the Code
in 1854, and now have such power under the Code, though the
Code does not mention the writ as one to be used to compel the
performance of a judicial act.
From an historical point of view it would be interesting to
trace the writ of mandamus from the period of the first use
down to the present time, but the same principles govern the
courts in issuing this writ now as formely, and as there is now
no question about the right of our court to issue it, the more
modern cases can be relied on for a statement of t6e doctrines,
controlling and regulating its use.
In the recent case of Speckert v. Ray, 166 Ky. 622, a petition was filed for a mandamus to compel a judicial officer to decide that service of process, which had been adjudged insufficient by the lower court, was good and brought the defendant
before the court, and that the court be required to take jurisdiction of the person of the defendant and proceed with the
hearing of the case. This case was elaborately argued, and the
court's opinion is exceedingly clear, and gives an excellent
statement of the doctrines which control the issuing of writs of
mandamus.
The court said:
"Section 110 of the Constitution provides that the Court of Appeals shall have power to issue such writs as may be necessary to
give it general control of inferior jurisdictions. We have never held
that the above provision of the Constitution authorizes this court to
exercise the power of determining questions that necessarily belong
to courts of original jurisdiction and over which they have complete
control, subject to an appeal to this court, where an appeal is allowed.
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The writ of mandamus cannot be issued to compel an inferior court
to decide a matter in any particular manner. The chief office of the
writ, as applied to courts, is to compel action by them; but when, as
in the instant case, the petition of the plaintiff alleges that the court
acted, but acted in a way different from what the plaintiff desired,
this court is Without power to interfere to the extent of compelling by
mandamus; such action or decision on the part of the circuit court as
will deprive it of the discretion cofiferred upon it by law."

The court also announced the following doctrines:
"Tn most of the states, however, the doctrine is as held in this
jurisdiction, that if an inferior tribunal has a discretion and proceeds
to exercise it, its discretion cannot be controlled by mandamus; but
if it has a discretion and refuses to exercise it, it can be compelled
to do so, though not in any particular direction.
"If, as claimed by the plaintiff, the circuit judge erred in the decision rendered, that fact would not authorize the granting of the
mandamus; or if, as further claimed by her, she were without right of
appeal from the decision, or other adequate remedy, the granting of
the mandamus would be equally unauthorized; as in either event we
would be confronted with the fact, that the circuit judge had a discretion over the subject matter involved in the question decided, and
that, in making the decision he exercised such discretion, for which
reasons no power exists in this court to compel by mandamus, a different decision."

In the case of Commonwealth v. MeCrone, 153 Ky. 296, an
action was brought by the county judge and road engineer to
compel the fiscal court to consent to the appointment of the plaintiff, as road engineer, made by the county judge. The court refused the mandamus and said:
"It may be issued to compel the performance of a ministerial act,
but not to control discretion. It may also issue against a tribunal,
or one who acts in a judicial capacity, to require it or him to proceed,
but the manner of proceeding must be left to his or its discretion."
In

the case of City of Louisville v. Kean, 18 B. Monroe 9,

the same principle was announced, as follows:
"But the doctrine seems to be well settled that when the inferior
tribunal, or the subordinate public agents have a discretion over the
subject matter, that discretion cannot be controlled by mandamus,
although it may have been improperly exercised. If there be a refusal
to act upon the subject, or to pass upon the question on which such discretion is to be exercised, then the writ may be used to enforce obedience to the law; but when the question has been passed upon, it will
not be used for the purpose of correcting the decision."

In the case of Carter County v. Mobley, 150 Ky. 482, the
court said:
"It may be conceded that, if an inferior tribunal or subordinate
body has a discretion and proceeds to exercise it, its discretion cannot
be controlled by mandamus; but, if it has a discretion and refuses to
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exercise it, it can be compelled to do so, though not in a particular
direction. But, when the inferior tribunal has certain duties to perform which are clearly and preemptorily enjoined by law, mandamus
Will lie to compel their performance."

In the case of Houston v. Boltz, 185 S. W. 80, the court
used this language:
"It is well settled that mandamus will not lie to control or review
the exercise of the discretion of any court, board or officer, when the
act compliined of is either judicial; or quasi judicial; but, when a duty
is mandatory, and no discretion is vested, its performance and manner
of performance both may be compelled by mandamus. In other words,
mandamus lies to compel the performance of a merely ministerial duty.
And, while there is some conflict of opinion as to what constitutes a
ministerial duty as distinguished from a discretionary duty, the distinction between merely ministerial and judicial and other official acts
seems to be that, when the law prescribes and defines the duty to be
performed with such precision and certainty as to leave nothing to the
exercise of discretion or judgment, the act is ministerial; and the fact
that certain incidents and details of the duty are discretionary is no
objection to starting performance of the duty itself."

in the case of Shine v. Ky. Central Railroad Company,
85 Ky. 182, the court said:
"The inferior court must be left free to exercise its own judgment;
and the opinion of another tribunal cannot be substituted for it."

In the same case the court, quoting from High on Extraordinary Remedies, says:
"In all cases where full and ample relief may be had, either by
appeal, writ of error or otherwise, from the judgment, decree or order
of a subordinate court, mandamus will not lie, since the courts will
not permit the functions of an appeal or writ of error to be usurped by
the writ of mandamus. Indeed, the interference in such cases would,
if tolerated, speedily absorb the entire time of appellate tribunals, in
revising and superintending the proceedings of inferior courts, and the
embarrassment and delay of litigation would soon become insupportable,
were the jurisdiction by mandamus sustained in cases properly falling
within the appellate powers of the higher court. It may, therefore, be
laid down as the universal rule prevailing in both England and America,
that the existence of another remedy adequate to correct the action of
the inferior court will prevent relief by mandamus."

In the case of Shoemaker v. Hodge, 111 Ky. 436, the court
issued a mandamus to compel a lower court to make a final order
in case, which was ready for decision, and which had precedence of other business, where action has been unnecessarily
delayed.
In Carter County &o v. Mobley, 150 Ky. 482, the fiscal court
of Carter County was required by mandamus to provide an in-
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spection of weights with weights, measures, balances and other
apparatus necessary to perform his duties in accordance with
act of General Assembly.
In the case of Morgan v. Champion, 150 Ky. 396, the court
indicated, that the fiscal court of Anderson County might be
compelled by mandamus to fill the office of county road engineer, on the ground that the appointment was made imperative on the county judge with the consent of the fiscal court, and
that they would not be permitted to avoid the operation of the
statute "for whimsical or arbitrary reasons."
In Hardison v. Pace, 121 S. W. 671, the court affirmed the
judgment of the circuit court, refusing a mandamus to require the judge of the quarterly court to permit an amended
pleading to be filed, so that an appeal might be taken, on the
ground that the writ of mandamus could not be used to require
an infreior court to decide a matter in any particular way.
In the case of Alexander, &c. v. Moss, 89 S. W. 118, the
court refused a mandamus to compel the judge of the lower
court to enter a judgment, dismissing the answer, after a demurrer had been sustained to same and the defendant declined
to plead further. The court said in this case, "certainty still
takes rank of celerity," but recognized the right to a mandamus under proper circumstances in such case. The court
said:
"Though we have no doubt that if the trial judge unduly delayed
taking any step in the case, so as to amount to a denial of justice in refusing a trial, when one was due, the power rests in this court, under the
Constitution to compel action; not that this court could order in advance of any trial any specific judgment to be entered, but the lower
court would be compelled to proceed with the case."

In the case of Montgomery v. Viers, 130 Ky. 694, an original
application was made in the Court of Appeals to require the
judge of the quarterly court to sign a judgment, which had
been rendered by a predecessor in office, and not signed by him.
The writ was denied primarily on the ground, that the plaintiff had an adequate remedy in that application ought to have
been made in the circuit court. The court admitted, however,
the original jurisdiction under the Constitution.
In the case of Com. v. Peter, 136 Ky. 689, the court held,
that a c6unty judge might be required by mandamus to compel
a personal representative to file an inventory of an estate, but
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the writ of mandamus was refused upon original application,
on the ground that the circuit court had general jurisdiction,
and the application should have been made to that court.
In the case of Cont. v. Berry, 92 S. W. 936, the court
granted a mandamus requiring the judge of the lower court to
set aside an order, appointing a stenographer to take down
testimony before the grand jury, on the grounds, that no one
other than the witness and the Commonwealth's attorney was
permitted to be present when the grand jury was sitting, and
that the remedy by appeal was not adequate.
In Monroe v. Berry, 94 S. W. 38, it was held that mandamus could not be issued to require the lower court to reduce
the amount of bail, as no application had been made to the
lower court for that purpose.
In the case of Kelly v. Toney, 95 Ky. 338, the court granted
the mandamus, requiring the judge of the lower court to give
to the petitioner an appeal. The court said:
"The complainant cannot obtain an appeal from this court until
after sixty days from the date of the judgment complained of and if
denied an appeal below he would be without remedy."

To the same effect is the case of Louisville Industrial School
v. City of Louisville, 88 Ky. 584.
Cases might be multiplied, showing under what circumstances the writ has been issued and refused, but the general
principles are so well settled, they may be briefly summarized
as follows:
1. The writ will not be issued to review or control the discretion
of a lower court but to compel action and prevent unnecessary delay.
2. Application for relief should first be made to the court sought to
'be controlled.
3. Application must be made to circuit court to control courts inferior to it and not to the Court of Appeals for exercise of the original
jurisdiction in the first instance.
4. The writ will not be issued, when there is an adequate remedy,
-and whether the remdey is adequate and appropriate is determined in
each case by the court in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion.
5. The writ is not used in lieu of or as a substitute for an appeal,
but may be Issued to require the lower court to grant an appeal, improperly refused.
6. The applicant or relator must have a clear, legal right to the
.performance of a particular act or duty, the performance of which has
been refused, and the writ will not be issued, when it would prove unavailing.
7. "Mandamus will lie to compel the performance of .duties purely
ministerial in their nature, and so clear and specific that no element of
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discretion is left in their performance, but that as to all acts or duties
necessarily calling for the exercise of judgment and discretion, on the
part of the officer or body at whose hands their performance is required,
mandamus will not lie."

(High's Extraordinary Relief, See. 24.)
In the case of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Craneh, in speaking
of the power of the Supreme Court to issue the writ of mandamus, the Chief Justice says:
"'To enable this court, then, to issue a mandamus, it must be shown
to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable
them to exercise appellate jurisdiction:'

To review the decisions of the Federal courts would prolong this paper beyond the time limited.
CONCLUSION

There is a tendency upon the part of appellate courts to
use the writs of prohibition and mandamus sparingly and only
upon clear grounds.
In the case of Morgan v. The Register, Hardin 619, decided
in 1808, at a time when the Court of Appeals of Kentucky had
only appellate jurisdiction, the court gave expression to the
apprehension, that the appellate court might be used to annoy,
harass and embarrass inferior courts and that it might be
burdened with actions in the first instance in the following
terms:
"And so it was wisely established by the framers of the Constitution,
otherwise that court which is to give light and direction to all other
tribunals of justice .might from the multiplicity of suits become only
the grave instead of being the soul of justice"

The case of Illinois CentraZ Railroad Company v. Baker,
155 Ky. 512, and the companion case of Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Rice, Judge, 154 Ky. 198, present an interesting question, which is not covered by the analysis of the writ
of prohibition herein made.
In the case of Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Baker,
155 Ky. 512, a suit in equity -was brought by the plaintiff to
require one person having an interest common to many to prosecute an action for the common benefit of about 1,600 persons
and to enjoin these persons from prosecuting separate actions
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in the quarterly court growing out of a common cause. The
lower court refused a temporary injunction, sustained a demurrer to the petition and the plaintiff declined to plead
further and prayed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. The
court held that, where a large number of persons had claims
arising out of the same transaction or resting upon the same
grounds, which were not legally enforeeble or meritorious, a
court of equity had jurisdiction to require the hearing and determination of all such cases in one action for the purpose of
preventing a multiplicity of suits.
After the temporary injunction was refused by the lower
court, the Illinois Central Railroad Company filed a petition
for a writ of prohibition against Rice, the judge of the quarterly
court, which case is reported in 154 Ky. 198, to restrain him
from trying the numerous cases, the prosecution of which was
sought to be enjoined in the case of Illinois Central Railroad
Company v. Baker.
The Court of Appeals in the Rice case granted a preliminary writ resembling a writ of prohibition restraining the
judge of the quarterly court from further proceedinj with the
trial of the cases, until the appeal in the equity case involved in
the Baker case was heard and determined, and stipulated the
time within which the record in the Baker case should be filed
in the Court of Appeals. This action was based upon the statement heretofore quoted from the decision of Rusk v. Denhardt,
in which it was said:
"But we have the power whenever justice and the right of the
matter seem to demand it, to interfere in behalf of a petitioner who has
no adequate remedy or means of obtaining relief, except to invoke the
extraordinary power conferred on this court by the Constitution, and a
case might present itself in which the ends of justice would require us
to issue the writ to restrain an inferior jurisdiction from doing any act
or rendering a judgment that the complaining party in the ordinary
course of judicial procedure would have no relief against. As courts are
established to administer justice, why should not the highest court in
the State, when there is no other adequate remedy in the exercise of the
ample and unquestioned power conferred upon it, lay its superintending
hand upon any inferior jurisdiction that is about to commit a judicial
wrong, and compel it to administer justice according to the right of the
case?"

The writ issued in the case of Illinois Central Railroad
Company v. Rice, resembles a writ of prohibition in its effect,
but in form and meaning is a temporary restraining order
against a judicial tribunal. The doctrine announced in Rush v.
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Denhardt, as applied in the Rice case, suggests what is clearly
true, that the Court of Appeals is not limited to writs of prohibition and mandamus in controlling inferior jurisdictions.
The power of the Court of Appeals under section 110 of the
Constitution is unlimited, and embraces the right and authority to control inferior jurisdictions in the exercise of a sound
judicial discretion when there is no adequate remedy, so that
absolute justice shall be done in an orderly manner.
There is no better statement of the breadth and scope of
the power of the Court of Appeals under section 110 of the
Constitution, than is found in the editor's note, to the case of
State, ex rel. Fourth National Bank v. Johnson, 51 L. R. A.,
p. 111, where it is said:
"As is so often stated in the decisions, the power of superintending
control is an extraordinary power. It is hampered by no specific rules
or means for its exercise. It is so general and comprehensive that its'
complete and full extent and use have practically hitherto not
been fully and completely known and exemplified. It is unlimited, being
bounded only by the exigencies which call for its exercise. As new instances of these occur it will be found able to cope with them. And, if
required, the tribunals having authority to exercise it will, by virtue of
it, possess the power to invent, frame and formulate new and additional
means, writs, and processes whereby it may be exerted."

